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Arbitrator or Private Investigator:
Should the Arbitrator'sDuty to Disclose
Include a Duty To Investigate?
Abdullah E. Al-Harbi v. Citibank; NA. and Citibank A.S.

I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution are replacing courtroom
litigation as a means of resolving problems because they are less time consuming,
less expensive and promote a friendlier atmosphere. In the case of arbitration, if
people are to continue to use arbitration and give arbitrator's decisions credibility,
there must be faith that the arbitrator is fair. There must also be a channel to
challenge the arbitrator's decision if it was not reached in a fair manner.' This
channel is provided statutorily by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) which allows
a decision to be reversed if the arbitrator displayed partiality to one side or the other
in the dispute.' The Supreme Court held that before the arbitration an arbitrator has
a duty to disclose any facts which would appear to make him or her biased.4 This
Casenote will discuss whether the duty to disclose should also carry with it a duty
to investigate for any facts that may cause the arbitrator to appear biased.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The parties in this dispute are Abdullah Al-Harbi, a Saudi Arabian citizen, and
Citibank A.S., (hereinafter Citibank) a subsidiary of Citibank, and N.A., 5 organized
under the Czech Republic. AI-Harbi alleges that Citibank defrauded him or
breached a fiduciary duty to him in a land transaction in which he became halfowner of a piece of real estate located in the Czech Republic.6

1. 85 F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
2. See, Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10.

3. Id.
4. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
5. AI-Harbi, 85 F.3d at 681.
6. Id In the transaction at hand, AI-Harbi paid $5,985,000 for half ownership in a piece of property
in the Czech Republic. AI-Harbi alleges that as a result of this transaction, he suffered losses of
$7,500,000. Id.
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In October of 1994, after negotiations were completed, the parties began nonbinding mediation before Kenneth Feinberg in London, England.7 After reaching
no agreement in the mediation, both sides agreed to binding arbitration. 8 In search
of a quick resolution, both sides agreed on Feinberg as the arbitrator. 9 The parties
also agreed upon an arbitration format where after both parties present their cases,
the arbitrator chooses one side's settlement figure."0 Feinberg chose Citibank's
figure and added $500,000 to it, awarding Al-Harbi $1,100,000."
Dissatisfied with the arbitrator's award, Al-Harbi brought an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia to vacate the arbitration
award.' 2 The District Court denied vacatur. 3 AI-Harbi appealed this ruling to the
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. 4
The Court of Appeals reasoned that only Al-Harbi's claims of "manifest
disregard of the law" and "evident partiality" were worthy of discussion. AI-Harbi
based his "evident partiality" of the arbitrator argument on the fact that Feinberg's
former law firm had represented his opponent, Citibank, on issues unrelated to the
present dispute between AI-Harbi and Citibank. 6 Al-Harbi stated that Feinberg did
not reveal this information to the parties involved, and the Court found that Feinberg
had no knowledge of this representation at the time of the arbitration. 7 Al-Harbi
asserts that Feinberg had a duty to make an inquiry as to whether or not his former
firm ever had any association with either of the parties and to disclose his findings. I"
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision to deny vacatur.' 9
The Court of Appeals disagreed with Al-Harbi's contention that an arbitrator has a
duty of investigation and found no "evident partiality".2' The Court of Appeals held
that unless the arbitrator is working under a special code which requires

7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id.Because of their wish for a quick resolution to the problem, both sides agreed on Feinberg
even though he recommended several alternative arbitrators for the sides to choose from. Id
10. Id.This is known as the "baseball" format. Id.
11. Id.at 682. An additional modification to the arbitration was agreed to by both parties. After
hearing each side's respective case, the arbitrator could choose one side's number and add or subtract
$500,000 to it. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit does not mention all ofthe claims
AI-Harbi argued to the district court, instead, it addressed only two. Id
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. AI-Harbi's claim of manifest disregard of the law was also denied by the D.C. Court of

Appeals. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. AI-Harbi makes this contention based on the ruling in Schmitz v. Zilveti. In Schmitz, the
Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's judgment upholding an arbitration award where the arbitrator's
law firm had represented one of the sides in the past. Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994).
19. Al-Harbi, 85 F.3d at 683.
20. Id.at 682.
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investigation, the arbitrator is under no duty to make an investigation to search for
facts which might create an impression of possible bias. 2

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1925 Congress passed the United States Arbitration Act (UAA), 9 U.S.C.,
§§ 1-14, which laid out a comprehensive plan for the arbitration of disputes falling
under its umbrella.22 Section 10 allows for vacation of an arbitrators award where
there is evident partiality or corruption by the arbitrator.3 "Evident partiality" takes
a literal meaning: conduct - or at least attitude or disposition - by the arbitrator
favoring one party over the other.' The provisions of the UAA show the intentions
to not only provide for arbitration, but to provide for impartial
of Congress
2
arbitration.
Throughout the recent history of this country, participants in the judicial system
who could show it was unknown to them that the judge in their case had a close
financial relationship with the other party in the controversy would be allowed to
challenge that judgment.' In Tumey v. State of Ohio, the Court held that a judgment
27
should be cast aside when there is "the slightest pecuniary interest" by the judge.
In Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. ContinentalCo., the Court stated that in
the case of the court system, the pecuniary interest of the judge and its influence on
him is a constitutional issue. 28 The Court held that there is no basis for refusing to
similarly interpret the statutory language which controls arbitration hearings and it
provided that an arbitration award can be cast aside on the basis of evident
partiality.29
The Court felt that it was even more important to safeguard the impartiality of
arbitrators as opposed to judges since arbitrators have complete freedom to decide
facts and law and since arbitrators are not subject to the oversight of appellate
review." The Court found that the arbitration process will not suffer from the
additional requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties involved any dealings
that might "create the impression of possible bias." Rather, it will benefit the process
because arbitrators are not subject to appellate review. 3'

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 682-83.
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Co., 393 U.S. 145, 146 (1968).
Id. at 147.
Id. at 154 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 147.
Id at 148.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1927).
Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 148.

29. Id.
30. Id. at 149.

31. Id.
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While not dispositive of the decision reached in Commonwealth Coatings, the
Court used section 18 of the Rules of the American Arbitration Association32 and the
33d Canon of Judicial Ethics33 to help shape its ruling. These two sources are based
on the principle that any tribunal permitted to hear cases must be unbiased and also
must avoid the appearance of bias. This principle helped the Court in
Commonwealth Coatings to reach the decision that an arbitrator has a duty to
disclose facts which might "create an impression of possible bias."34'
The duty owed to a party by arbitrators is similar to the duty owed by judges. 5
In Commonwealth Coatings, the Court, however, did not hold arbitrators to the same
standards of decorum applicable to judges. 6 It is because arbitrators are often from
the business realm and not the judiciary that they are successful in their positions.37
Because of this, arbitrators should not be automatically disqualified by a business
relationship with one of the parties before them if both parties are informed of the
relationship in advance or if the parties are unaware of the facts but the relationship
is trivial.38 This would accomplish the automatic disqualification of the most
informed and capable potential arbitrators.3 9
In some situations, the arbitrator might reasonably believe the business
relationship to be so insubstantial that revealing it would suggest that the arbitrator
is easily influenced and not impartial.' The Court in Commonwealth Coatings,
therefore, arrived at the notion that if the law were to 4 require this disclosure no
such view of bias would arise.42 It is preferred that relationships between the
arbitrator and parties be disclosed from the beginning when the parties may reject
or accept the arbitrator or accept the arbitrator with the knowledge of this

32. Id Section 18. "Disclosure by Arbitrator of Disqualification - At the time of receiving his notice

of appointment, the prospective Arbitrator is requested to disclose any circumstances likely to create a
presumption of bias or which he believes might disqualify him as an impartial Arbitrator. Upon receipt
of such information, the Tribunal Clerk shall immediately disclose it to the parties, who if willing to
proceed under the circumstances disclosed, shall, inwriting, so advise the Tribunal Clerk. If either party
declines to waive the presumptive disqualification, the vacancy thus created shall be filed inaccordance
with the applicable provisions of this Rule." Section 18 the Rules of American Arbitration Association
(quoted inCommonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
33. "Social Relations. Ajudge should, however, inpending or prospective litigation before him be
particularly careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion that his social
or business relations or friendships, constitute an element in influencing his judicial conduct." 33d
Canon of Judicial Ethics (quoted in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Co., 393 U.S. 145,
149 (1968)).
34. Commonwealth Coatings,393 U.S. at 147-49.
35. See generally id.at 147-49.
36. See generally id. at 150. (White, B., concurring).
37. Id.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id
Id
Idat 151.
Id.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1997/iss1/7

4

19971

Jacobs: Jacobs: Arbitrator or Private Investigator:
Arbitratoras PrivateInvestigator

relationship, rather than after the arbitration43 when the losing party can use this
factor to attempt to invalidate the award."
When the arbitrator discloses such facts which might give rise to an impression
of bias, the arbitrator does not have to present his whole business history.4" It is
enough that where the arbitrator has a substantial interest in a law firm which has
conducted more than trivial business transactions with a party, the relationship must
be disclosed.' When arbitrators "err on the side of disclosure," it is easy for courts
to identify those undisclosed relationships which are not substantial enough to
warrant the vacation of an award.47
Instead, for a court to overturn an arbitrator's award, the moving party "must
show that a reasonable person would conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the
other party."" It is established that the mere appearance of bias will not be enough
to show evident partiality.49 Therefore, the party asserting evident partiality has the
burden of proof.5 0 The partiality must be "direct, definite, and capable of
demonstration, rather than remote, uncertain, or speculative".5 ' This places a heavy
burden on the party moving for vacation of the award. The moving party must also
establish specific facts which indicate improper motives by the arbitrator. 2 The
policy rationale behind 9 U.S.C. § 10 supports the notion that the standard for
nondisclosure cases should be different from the standard applied in actual bias
cases.5 3 In a nondisclosure case, the integrity of the process in which arbitrators are
chosen is at issue. 5' In an actual bias case, the arbitrator has acted with bias when
rendering a decision. Thus, if a party is able to show a "reasonable impression of
partiality," this will be enough in a nondisclosure case because the policy of §
10(a)(2) instructs parties to choose arbitrators wisely. 5 The parties are able to
choose their arbitrators wisely only when facts which might show potential bias are
disclosed. 6
Although lack of knowledge of disclosable facts may prohibit actual bias, these
facts still give a reasonable impression of partiality. 7 An arbitrator may have a duty
to investigate for possible bias independent of the Commonwealth Coatings duty to

43. Id.

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.at 151-52.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
at 152.
Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993).
Health Serv. Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id.
at 1258.
Id. at 1264.
Peoples Security, 991 F.2d at 146.
Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1048.
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disclose."8 Ignoring this duty to investigate could result in a failure to disclose which
creates a reasonable impression of partiality under Commonwealth Coatings."9

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The D.C. Court of Appeals reasoned that AI-Harbi's ability to show evident
partiality was dependent on the proposition that the arbitrator had a duty to inquire
as to whether or not his former law firm had dealings with either of the parties and
a duty to disclose the results of that inquiry.' This court began its analysis of AlHarbi's evident partiality claim by finding that his reliance on Schmitz v. Zilveti was
erroneous. 61 The court noted that Schmitz was from the Ninth Circuit and held no
precedential value in this circuit.' The court distinguished Schmitz from the present
case on both the facts and the law.63
In Schmitz, the arbitrator was running the hearing under the National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") code, and in the present case the NASD
code did not apply.' The Court also found the facts to be different because in
Schmitz, the firm the arbitrator worked for still conducted business dealings with one
of the parties to the arbitration. 61 In the present case, the arbitrator had formerly
worked for a firm which had represented Citibank on matters totally unrelated to the
present arbitration.'
Next, in order to determine whether a duty to investigate underlies an
arbitrator's duty to disclose facts which could "create an impression of possible
bias,"6 ' the D.C. Court of Appeals looked to the reasoning of two cases which
resulted in the same conclusion: A district court decision in their circuit, Overseas
Private Inv. Corp. v. Anaconda Co. ("OPIC"), 6s and Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v.
Monumental Life Ins. Co.6

58. Id.

59. Id.
60. AI-Harbi, 85 F.3d at 682.
61. Id.

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. ld. The NASD code requires arbitrators to make an investigation of their relationship to the
parties involved to uncover any relevant information. Id.
65. Id.In Schmitz, the arbitrator of the proceedings worked for a law firm that had represented a
subsidiary of one of the parties in nineteen cases over thirty-five years, the most recent of which occurred
twenty-one months before the arbitration. Id.
66. Id at 683. The D.C. Court of Appeals recognized that in the present case, the arbitrator's only
continued connection with his former firm was an interest in receivables, none of which were generated
by the parties in the present arbitration. Id.
67. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149.
68. 418 F.Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1976).
69. 991 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1993). The facts in Peoples Security are more analogous to the ones in
the present case. In that case, the arbitrator worked in the New York offices of the LeBocuf law firm.
An attorney named James Nolan signed the initial complaint on behalf of one of the parties to the
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In OPIC,the district court held that where no reasonable person could find the
arbitrator "to have known any potentially prejudicial information" before rendering
there was no reason to conclude the arbitrator displayed evident
the decision,
70
partiality.
The D.C. Court of Appeals found PeoplesSecurity Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental
7
Life Ins. Co. to be very similar on a factual basis to the present case. Although the
Fourth Circuit did not specifically address the arbitrator's duty to disclose and its
relationship with a duty of investigate, the Fourth Circuit stated that the party
asserting evident partiality has the burden of proof.72 The Fourth Circuit went on to
say that the "alleged partiality must be direct, definite, and capable of demonstration
rather than remote, uncertain or speculative".73
In the present case, the D.C. Court of Appeals adopts the position of the Fourth
Circuit, holding that the burden on a party for vacation of an arbitration award on the
grounds of evident partiality is great and that the party must establish specific facts
that point to improper motives by the arbitrator. 74 Because of this high standard for
the court affirmed the district court's denial of vacating the arbitration
vacatur,
75
award.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Silberman agreed with the majority's holding
that an arbitrator has no duty to investigate past employer's client lists in an effort to
76
find disclosable information absent such governing rules as the NASD guidelines.
77
In Judge Silberman's opinion, this would only increase the costs of the arbitration.

Judge Silberman disagreed with the reasoning in the present case. The absence of a
duty to investigate cannot be explained by the burden of proof on the party seeking
to vacate the decision.S Rather, Silberman believed that if there was a duty to
investigate, the burden of proof could be met by showing that the arbitrator failed to

make the investigation.79

arbitration under review in PeoplesSecurity. This party then had a different firm represent them. While
the arbitration was going on, Nolan joined the LeBoeuf Washington offices. The arbitrator did not know
Nolan personally, much less that he had joined the firm. The losing party claimed this connection
caused evident partiality by the arbitrator. Id. at 143-45.
70. OPIC,418 F.Supp. at 112.
71. Peoples Security, 991 F.2d at 141.

72. Id. at 146 (quotingFlorasmith Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 173-74 (2nd Cir. 1984)).
73. Id.
74. AI-Harbi, 85 F.3d at 683.
75. Id.

76. Id. at 684.
77. Id.

78. Id.
79. Id.
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V. COMMENT
The D.C. Circuit Court in Al-Harbiv. Citibank8 ° had two paths it could follow
when determining if there was a duty to investigate. One path was expressed by the
Ninth Circuit in Schmitz when it stated that there is evident partiality when
undisclosed facts show "a reasonable impression of partiality."'" In such cases
"actual partiality of the arbitrator is not required."' Thus, although the arbitrator had
no present knowledge of information, the duty to investigate would result in
acquiring this knowledge and making it available for disclosure.
The D.C. Circuit could also choose the approach laid out by the Fourth Circuit
in PeoplesSecurity. In the Fourth Circuit, evident partiality is shown by establishing
"specific facts that indicate improper motives" by the arbitrator. 3 Accordingly, the
rationale is that a duty to investigate is not necessary because there is a heavy burden
placed on the moving party to show improper motives on the part of the arbitrator."
If the arbitrator had no present knowledge of "bias" but had to investigate to gain this
knowledge, there could be no improper motive displayed by the arbitrator.85
In comparing these two approaches, it is best to look to the purposes behind the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Commonwealth Coating'sdecision. In the FAA,
Congress desired to create impartial arbitrations.'
In Commonwealth Coatings,the
Court found the duty of disclosure necessary to avoid even the appearance of bias
in arbitration." The Ninth Circuit's approach in Schmitz appears on its face to best
achieve these purposes.
Under Schmitz, it is only necessary to show a reasonable impression of
impartiality. 8 The court held that an arbitrator ignoring a duty to investigate could
possibly lead to a failure to disclose which would create a reasonable impression of
partiality. 9 By not investigating former clients, present firm's clients, former firm's
clients, and the two parties' associations to these people; an arbitrator may not find
hidden ties that would create an impression of bias because the relations would not
be disclosed, even if nominal. This duty to investigate, however, would increase the
cost of arbitration' and the time involved to hold the arbitration.
This approach is consistent with the ideas behind the Commonwealth Coating's
duty to disclose, plus it adds the additional duty to investigate requirement which
increases the burden on the arbitrator and the parties involved.

80.
81.
82.
83.

Al-Harbi, 85 F.3d 680.
Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1046.
Id.
Peoples Security, 991 F.2d at 146.
84. Id.
85. See Al-Harbi, 85 F.3d at 683.
86. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 147.
87. Id at 150.
88. Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048.
89. Id.
90. AI-Harbi, 85 F.3d at 684.
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On its face, the Peoples Security approach of "direct and definite" partiality rather
than the "remote and speculative" test of Schmitz9' does not seem to be in line with
the Commonwealth Coating's decision or the FAA. A closer look, however, reveals
that the "direct and definite" test for evident partiality takes a common sense
approach and works just as well without adding additional time or cost to thearbitration. With the Commonwealth Coating's ruling, an arbitrator has a duty to
disclose any facts which create an impression of bias.' If an arbitrator or the
arbitrator's firm has had dealings with either of the two parties and knows at the
present time of this association, then the arbitrator must disclose these facts or be in
violation of the Commonwealth Coating's duty.93 If an arbitrator were to fail to
disclose facts of which he or she was aware before arbitration, this would appear to
be an improper motive under the People'sSecurity test for evident partiality.'
Under the Fourth Circuit approach where no duty to investigate exists, when
an arbitrator that has no knowledge of any "bias" facts and doesn't disclose them
because they are either so attenuated the arbitrator cannot know of them without
investigation or because they have not happened at the beginning of the arbitration,
common sense dictates that there can be no bias by the arbitrator because if an
arbitrator has no knowledge of "bias" facts without investigation, how can the
arbitrator be biased by them? Similarly, if events that look like bias do not happen
until after the arbitration, the arbitration has not been affected. Using the Ninth
Circuit's approach would allow a court to find a "reasonable impression of
partiality" 5 in these two scenarios when in fact it did not exist.
Following the Ninth Circuit approach would not give the public more trust and
confidence in the arbitration system, as the policy behind the FAA and
Commonwealth Coating'sholding seems to promote. Instead, because there was no
real partiality displayed on the part of the arbitrator without a duty to investigate, the
public will view the losing party to an arbitration as "clutching at straws in an
attempt to avoid the results" of an unfavorable decision.' In turn, this will cause the
public to lose confidence in binding arbitration because a decision may be
overturned on evident partiality grounds if the duty to investigate is not performed'
or is not performed satisfactorily. In addition, the increased costs9" incurred by the
arbitrator in making these investigations will be reflected in the *costof the arbitration
to the two parties involved. Also, another advantage of arbitration, faster resolution
of disputes, will suffer a blow. Undoubtedly, much time will be added to the
arbitration process while the arbitrator searches through countless personal client

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 683.
Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149.
Id.
See Peoples Security, 991 F.2d at 146.
Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048.
Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 153 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048.
Al-Harbi, 85 F.3d at 684.
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lists, client lists of present and former firms, plus the backgrounds of the two parties
to the arbitration in search of any possible grounds for an evident partiality claim.

VI. CONCLUSION
In choosing to follow the common sense approach of the Fourth Circuit, the
D.C. Circuit developed a test which serves two purposes: (1) keeping arbitrations
impartial and (2) reinforcing the public's faith in the arbitration process. At the same
time, the test does not add any unnecessary costs or burdens to the arbitrator, the
parties involved, or the arbitration proceeding itself.

R. TRAViS JACOBS
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